Major Themes in Economics
Volume 9

Article 7

Spring 2007

The Implications of Eminent Domain in a Post-Kelo World
Brock L. Toll
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright ©2007 by Major Themes in Economics
Recommended Citation
Toll, Brock L. (2007) "The Implications of Eminent Domain in a Post-Kelo World," Major Themes in
Economics, 9, 74-93.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol9/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CBA Journals at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Major Themes in Economics by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

The Implications of Eminent Domain in a
Post-Kelo World
Brock L. Toll
ABSTRACT. Eminent domain has been a government power for centuries. In most cases,
eminent domain is used to provide essential public goods. Using it for the advantage of
private entities is hotly debated. The 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo vs. New
London allowed the use of eminent domain for privately driven endeavors. By examining
the holdout problem, compensation and the effects of the Kelo case, national reform is
determined as the best solution to private/public ventures using eminent domain.

I. Introduction
Of all tyrannies, a tyranny exercised for the good of its victims
may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under robber
barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber
baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some
point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will
torment us without end, for they do so with the approval of their
own conscience.
C.S. Lewis
The power of eminent domain and the classic freedom stemming from
property rights are fundamentally opposed. For decades, property rights
have been molded by increased government power made possible through
judicial interpretation. To combat this trend, disgruntled citizens have
taken the fight to activist governmental bodies. This movement is
characterized by a dramatic mental shift in Americans, a phenomenon
depicted by this anecdote from the 1950’s. An Ohio businessman named
Albert was on his way out of the office. He put on his coat and headed for
the door when his father stopped him.
"Al, where are you going?"
"I’m going to meet the Ohio Department of Transportation,” replied
Al.
"How come?"
"Dad, you know the land we have on Mayfield Road? They’re going
to take that and put a highway right through it."
75
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And Albert’s father…looked at him and said, "That’s going to be
terrific for our land. How much do we have to pay them for that?"
Albert replied, “No, Dad, you have it mixed up. We don’t pay them,
they pay us."
At this point, Albert’s father declared, “What a country.” [Oder,
2006]

The tale chronicles a rose-colored frame of mind that some irritated
property owners today know nothing about. Anger over condemnation of
private property does hearken back to another pivotal time in American
history. The Founding Fathers attempted to protect private property in the
midst of building a nation. The Fifth Amendment’s famous Takings
Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation” [Wikipedia, 2007]. While the intent may have been
honorable, the clause implies that private property can be condemned
under two pretenses: The property will be taken for a public use and the
owner will be justly compensated.
Arthur Lee, an American Revolutionary from Virginia, defended the
right to property in the early stages of the American democracy when he
asserted, “The right of property is the guardian of every other right, and
to deprive the people of this is, in fact, to deprive them of their liberty.”
The right to pursue and possess property has been a quintessential
element of American freedom since the country’s inception. Given these
preconceptions, every American has a stake in the condition of property
rights today. To impede property rights with eminent domain is to
infringe on the foundation of America.
Ethically speaking, the taking of that which is not yours is a serious
moral problem. By taking private property, the moral fortitude of America
is called into question. From an economics perspective, the institution of
private property is an essential element in strong economies. Solid private
property rights give owners incentive to take care of what they own. This
contributes to economic growth, trade, and efficient production.
However, in the complex, shrinking world of today, eminent domain will
surely not go away. In certain instances, eminent domain may even prove
to be a legitimate tool for economic growth and development. To better
understand the evolution, process, and future of eminent domain, this
paper explores both sides of the issue to conclude that national reform is
the best compromise.
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II. Background
Eminent domain has recently become a hot-button issue. This is largely
due to the June 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New
London. In a tight 5-4 decision, the Court instigated a public policy
controversy in the timeless debate over private property rights [Dearth
and Hardin, 2006, 21]. The ruling upheld the decision of the Connecticut
Supreme Court in a case that allowed the taking of 15 private properties
for an economic development project [Garrett and Rothstein, 2007, 5].
The plaintiffs in Kelo attempted to stop a development project that
promised to bring a plethora of new retail and commercial entities to New
London, including a new Pfizer pharmaceutical plant [Sandefur, 2006,
97]. Residents such as Susette Kelo were outraged that their homes could
be taken to fulfill the planning objectives of local officials. The city
objective was to revitalize Fort Trumbull, a 90 acre economically
distressed area [Dearth and Hardin, 2006, 21]. In fact, the city was so
depressed that it had endured three decades of economic and population
decline that left only 44 percent of real property in the tax base. The
development project would also create at least 1,000 new jobs, which
would reduce an unemployment rate that was nearly double the state
average [Zax and Malcolm, 2005, 85].
By not overturning the lower court’s decision, property right activists
argue that the Supreme Court expanded the power of eminent domain into
the realm of development. In doing so, opponents see an incongruent
ruling outside the customary use of eminent domain. The ruling seems to
interpret the words “public use” as anything for a public purpose. The
difference between these two concepts cuts to the crux of this matter.
Traditionally, public use has meant structures open to the public such as
highways, government buildings, and parks. Public purpose has been
more comprehensive and less public in the strict sense of the word. A
public purpose is any measure that conceivably benefits the public even
if that means transferring private property from one individual to another.
The evolution of eminent domain from a public use to a public purpose
seems trivial, but the consequences are surely not. However, as prior
judicial decisions show, the precedent may have already been set in
motion. Even before Supreme Court Justice Stevens wrote the majority
opinion in Kelo, there have been a number of key judicial decisions that
broadened the Takings Clause.
In 1896, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley dealt with a group of
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land owners who were forced to pay for an irrigation ditch. The Supreme
Court decided the “irrigation of arid land served a public purpose and the
water was ‘put to’ a public use” [Garrett and Rothstein, 2007, 7].
According to the Bradley case, the shift of eminent domain from a public
use to a public purpose was established before Kelo.
The boundaries of eminent domain would not be seriously tested for
over half a century in the wake of the Bradley case. In 1954, Berman v.
Parker addressed a Washington D.C. decision to condemn private
properties under a blight designation, a historically broad tag in which
local officials can declare a property obsolete. In the Berman case, a nonblighted property owner objected to the taking of his property just
because adjacent properties were deemed blighted. The Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the development, which furthered the doctrine of public
purpose and affirmed the legal use of blight.
Thirty years later in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court
broke up a land oligopoly in Hawaii. While the case was somewhat of an
anomaly, the end result confirmed the forced legal transfer of private
property from one individual to another [Garrett and Rothstein, 2007, 7].
Lastly, in the 1992 case of National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston
& Maine Corp., the Court upheld the forced transfer of a rail line from
one company to the next. A government entity determined that the
original company could not sufficiently maintain the rail line. The Court
agreed, stating they could not “strike down a condemnation…so long as
the taking is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose”
[Echeverria, 2005b, 1].
It is clear Kelo was not the first case to consider the power of eminent
domain. Some argue that Kelo has only served to reaffirm these earlier
decisions. Others will go as far as to say that Kelo actually tightened the
use of eminent domain altogether. In the other corner, property rights
activists want to strike down Kelo. These activists believe Kelo expanded
government powers and diminished individual rights. In the end, there
will always be two viewpoints to eminent domain. To determine the most
efficient solution, I will explore both sides of this polarizing issue in more
depth.

III. Diametrically Opposed – Both Sides of the Issue
As the case law suggests, the evolution of public use into a reasonable
public purpose has marked a parallel progression in the use of eminent
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domain. If eminent domain ever meant the transfer of private property to
the government for public goods, it is no longer just that. The courts have
sided with the overall economic progress of the whole rather than the
individual. In practice, private development for the greater good and the
government power of eminent domain go hand in hand. Lawrence O.
Gostin, Director of the Georgetown Center for the Law and Public’s
Health, confirms this notion:
Government must make hard choices when faced with
desperately poor and dilapidated inner cities. It is not possible to
act boldly for the common good while privileging a small handful
of property owners. Nor is it possible to revitalize communities
without conferring some economic advantage on private
developers [2006, 11].
With ardent support on both sides, the issue can be lost in a dizzying mess
of rhetoric and politics. However, the sheer volume of discussion makes
for clear points of contention to help form possible solutions.
A. KELO V. NEW LONDON–EXPANSION OR RETRACTION?
One popular disagreement stems from whether Kelo actually expanded
the power of eminent domain. John D. Echeverria, Director of the
Georgetown Environmental Law & Policy Institute, argues that the Court
has already upheld the use of eminent domain for justifiable public
purposes. Echeverria believes “it is incorrect to suggest that Kelo broke
new ground and expanded government’s power of eminent domain”
[2005b, 3]. He contends that the Kelo decision restricted the use of
eminent domain for economic development. Echeverria defends his
assertion on the principle components of the majority decision in Kelo.
First, the Court held that any development project must be publicly heard
and approved by city officials in order to emphasize comprehensive
consideration. The majority opinion also made clear it would not blindly
uphold “a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines
of an integrated development plan” [Echeverria, 2005b, 4]. The Court’s
decision strongly suggested “the developer chosen to implement the
development be bound to carry out the redevelopment and serve as the
public’s agent” [Echeverria, 2005b, 4]. Comprehensive consideration will
force municipalities to explore all possibilities in their development plan.
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By contractually binding the developer, citizens will have legal backing
to increase the probability of project success.
Furthermore, Echeverria cites Supreme Court Justice Kennedy’s
decisive, concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy argued in favor of the New
London redevelopment because essential factors applied. These aspects
included the city wide depression in New London, which fueled the
formulation of a “comprehensive development plan” without private
influence present or procedural requirements neglected [Echeverria,
2005b, 4].
On the dissenting side, Supreme Court Justice O’Connor described
prior precedents as “condemning land to eliminate an identifiable public
harm caused by the property” [Castle Coalition, 2006, 1]. While this may
be true, a municipality could identify any harm it sees fit to go forward
with a self-proclaimed redevelopment project. In this sense, the
speculative powers of eminent domain were not expanded beyond prior
decisions even though the stated intentions were more explicit. Justice
O’Connor has mischaracterized the situation. Clearly the crucial
aforementioned cases did not go forward due solely to “an identifiable
public harm.” Other issues were at hand in many of the projects even if
a public harm was a contributing factor. To say that a public harm was the
overriding aspect of prior cases is a slanted opinion, which Justice
O’Connor has put forth in an attempt to reverse previous decisions. The
activist courts of the past have constrained the conservative, dissenting
Justices in the Kelo decision. Subsequently, they are forced to restructure
the precedent in order to reaffirm private property rights.
B. INCREASES IN EMINENT DOMAIN USAGE
In terms of actual numbers, anti-eminent domain lobbyist groups such as
the Castle Coalition confirm an increase in condemnations since Kelo.
According to their research, more than 10,000 condemnations were “filed
or threatened” from 1998 to 2002 [2006, 4]. Since the Kelo decision, the
Coalition reports over 5,000 condemnations during the period of June
2005 to June 2006 [2006, 4]. While these numbers may seem startling at
first, the data represent individual condemnations, which sometimes were
only threatened. All else equal, the sudden doubling in condemnations
does seem troubling. However, the Coalition’s findings hardly constitute
any kind of irrational, wide-spread public harm.
The Castle Coalition attempts to make the public feel helpless with
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these numbers, and show that political processes are not a strong enough
check. Repeated abuse of eminent domain and a rational, comprehensive
development plan should not occur simultaneously. This is a clear benefit
of the Kelo case. A comprehensive development plan will not end
corruption, but it will help rationally guided projects to succeed. If bad
development projects occur, the political process can represent a solid
check against unwarranted use of public power. In a case covered by 60
Minutes, city officials in Lakewood, Ohio targeted a residential
neighborhood. In the next general election, the mayor was not re-elected,
and the unpopular and imprudent use of eminent domain was thwarted
[Echeverria, 2005a, 2]. One Supreme Court case cannot cut through the
corruption of man in one fell swoop, but it can point us in a better
direction.
C. EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
The effectiveness of eminent domain for economic growth is greatly
debated. In The Taking of Prosperity by Garrett and Rothstein, the authors
assert that eminent domain for development has a negative economic
effect [2007, 9]. In a simple example, the authors illustrate their
viewpoint:
Suppose a local government takes $10,000 from Peter and gives
it to Paul, who plans to open a business. Paul then uses the
$10,000 to open his business, which creates tax revenue and jobs.
From a social welfare point of view, Peter loses $10,000 and the
savings or consumption benefits of his $10,000. Paul gains
$10,000 to open a business, and jobs are created. By taking the
$10,000 from Peter and giving it to Paul, the local government is
essentially saying that Paul can create greater societal wealth
with Peter’s $10,000 than Peter can. The same would be true if
local governments paid Peter for his house and then gave the
property to Paul for development purposes [2007, 9].
Garrett and Rothstein argue that replicating this scenario thousands or
millions of times will result in a zero-sum gain [2007, 9]. Furthermore,
they claim that given additional expenditures inherent in eminent domain
proceedings, the net result will be negative [2007, 9].
Unfortunately, their argument is inherently flawed due to its
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simplicity. They simply assume that Paul’s venture will not create greater
societal wealth. There is no basis for this assumption, yet they replicate
it a million times to conclude that eminent domain is a zero-sum
endeavor. If eminent domain is available to private/public enterprises,
they have gained $10,000 in property while Peter has been reimbursed at
least $10,000. Since many areas targeted by development projects are
dilapidated, it is difficult to understand how new capital will not be a
positive net gain. The resulting loss or gain on the project is shouldered
by the development enterprise. The financial scrutiny by the private
development company will not allow negative growth projects to go
forward. When the private developer is obligated contractually, this will
most certainly be true.
Eminent domain may not be the cause of economic growth, but it can
help ensure positive growth projects are not derailed. “Eminent domain
is essential…to proceed with redevelopment in an open and transparent
fashion, and to achieve efficient and effective redevelopment”
[Echeverria, 2005a, 3]. However, the Castle Coalition cites evidence to
the contrary. In a Scottsdale, Arizona case, the Castle Coalition claims the
threat of eminent domain “stonewalled $2 billion of successful
redevelopment for years” with money flowing in “only after Scottsdale
removed the threat of eminent domain” [2007, 5]. This point is very
plausible. However, it paints a dire picture of American property rights
that simply is not true. Practically speaking, new developments need not
worry about the use of eminent domain. These developments are the
reason for eminent domain if land assembly problems occur.
Subsequently, they will not be targeted in the future by eminent domain
unless the property or area become obsolete or if a necessary public use
is identified. This could happen anywhere, and the occurrence does not
signal weak or irrational property rights.
D. IS EMINENT DOMAIN REQUIRED FOR DEVELOPMENT?
Property rights activists cite successful ventures such as Disney World
and an entirely new city created in Howard County, Maryland as
examples of development without eminent domain [Castle Coalition,
2006, 9]. In fact, the majority of development is completed without
eminent domain. In Utah, redevelopment agencies have not been able to
use eminent domain since March 2005, but construction has exceeded the
previous year’s expenditures by 28.7 percent [Castle Coalition, 2006, 9].
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However, this measure does not account for inflation nor does it
satisfactorily link the value of construction with the absence of eminent
domain.
The real issue for development in relation to eminent domain is the
refusal power of property owners to sell their property. This can cause
serious problems in land assembly for development, especially when ideal
tracts are identified. Real estate is a distinctive commodity in that every
parcel is absolutely finite and geographically unique. The use of eminent
domain spawns from the bundle of rights inherent in every property. In
turn, the rights secured through private property leads to the holdout
problem, an issue requiring further exploration.

IV. The Holdout Problem
The holdout problem is a term used to describe a property owner who
refuses to sell his property. The economics of the holdout or assembly
problem can be best explained using a model derived by Thomas J. Miceli
in his book, The Economic Approach to Law. In figure 1, Miceli explores
the economic advantage gained by property owners who choose to hold
out.
By examining the graph closely, the optimum number of parcels to be
acquired can be found at q* where the marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves intersect. If the project is successfully completed, the surplus
realized by the project can be found in the triangle abe. If any individual
property owner chooses to holdout, the model is thrown out of
equilibrium to q1. The holdout owner can then demand the true reservation
price, represented by height d, plus any amount of the additional surplus
represented by triangle cde. If other properties are required for the
development to succeed, the project is essentially vetoed by one holdout
owner. The triangle cde would then represent a deadweight loss to the
development company. In practice, while holdout owners are usually in
the minority, there tends to be more than one. Consequently, development
projects face the holdout problem repeatedly. Obviously, “this problem
poses a serious impediment to the completion of the project” [Miceli,
2004, 216].
In holdout scenarios, the property owner can disrupt a development
project not only by holding out, but also by requiring an irrational amount
of compensation. Miceli characterizes this advantage as granting a
“significant monopoly power on individual owners, who can hold out for
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prices well in excess of their true valuations” [2004, 216]. In doing so,
there is an economic market failure on the supply side caused by
irrational expectations [Miceli, 2004, 216].

q* = Equilibrium quantity of parcels
q1 = Holdout point
MC = Reservation price of an individual parcel
MB = Marginal Benefit of project as a function of q
Miceli further explains the economics of the holdout problem in
relation to public and private use in four distinct categories [2004, 218]:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Private ventures without an assembly problem.
Private ventures with an assembly problem.
Public ventures without an assembly problem.
Public ventures with an assembly problem.

In situation 1, a private entity with no assembly problem has no need for
eminent domain. In situation 4, a public entity can lawfully use the power
of eminent domain for a public good such as a park. However, situations
2 and 3 have conflicting values.
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In situation 3, the public good being provided could justify eminent
domain, but there is no assembly problem. If there is no holdout problem,
“the transaction costs of using the market are typically less than that of
using eminent domain” which minimizes the risk of government abuse
[Miceli, 2004, 218].
Situation 2 represents the issue at hand in the Kelo case. A private
entity cannot exercise the power of eminent domain, but the holdout
problem calls for its use. In practice, the Courts have upheld numerous
private/public development enterprises given a holdout problem. In
economic evaluations, the “takings power should be extended to any
party, public or private” that is facing a holdout problem [Miceli, 2004,
219]. By allowing eminent domain in privately driven ventures, value is
not destroyed by the irrational reservation prices of holdout owners.
Additionally, the mere threat of eminent domain will distinguish the
holdout problem in most situations. This will ultimately save the extra
expenses associated with litigation [Miceli and Segerson, 2006a, 14]. In
the end, the best economic solution for the whole is realized when
eminent domain can be utilized in holdout situations.
In cause-effect terms, the holdout problem represents the economic
basis for the use of eminent domain. However, many eminent domain
cases regarding private development are adjudicated in terms of public
benefits. To address this misguided practice, Miceli and Segerson propose
a two-pronged test [2006b, 6]. The use of eminent domain is justifiable
if the project will concurrently create a social benefit and is hindered by
a holdout problem. In an ideal world, the first restraint will ensure that all
parties involved will be considered. Unfortunately, the test does not
address whether or not the compensation will be just. The authors suggest
that if the two-pronged test is met, “the fairness issue stemming from
under-compensation is more appropriately addressed by an adjustment in
the amount of compensation” [Miceli and Segerson, 2006b, 6]. By
considering the level of compensation, the gap between the equilibrium
quantity of a development project and the inefficiency created by a
holdout can be lessened.

V. Compensation
The just compensation parameter of the Takings Clause requires a fair
market value reimbursed to the owner of the condemned property. The
total compensation in forced takings can be split into two parts, the fair
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market value portion and a personal portion. The fair market value does
not include the personal portion which includes a variety of less tangible
factors such as economic loss, subjective loss, and dignitary harms
[Garnett, 2006, 3]. To determine fair market value in forced sales is
difficult. There is no true market to dictate the price. This is an essential
concept of real estate appraisal. It is assumed under fair market
evaluations that the “buyer and seller are typically motivated” [The
Appraisal Institute, 2001, 23]. In projects threatening eminent domain,
the buyer and sometimes even the seller are not typically motivated. For
this reason, the personal portion is compensated individually to account
for uncertainty in transactions affected by eminent domain.
Economic losses include relocation and replacement expenses above
and beyond the market value of the condemned property. Compared to
other costs, economic losses are much easier to quantify. The cost of
boxes, a moving van, or a replacement home can be determined without
much hassle. In reality, economic losses can be easily compensated in
eminent domain cases.
An exceedingly difficult parameter to measure is subjective loss.
Subjective value on a home, land or business can vary greatly between
owners even if the parcels are similar. Sentimental connection can force
an owner’s reservation price well above fair market value. These feelings
can even lead to emotional trauma in the wake of condemnation, and must
be considered if eminent domain is utilized [Garnett, 2006, 4].
Lastly, dignitary harms encompass a wide variety of problems.
Owners may feel offended by the insinuation that there property could be
put to better use. They can also feel targeted if other properties close to
them were not condemned. Condemned owners who stay in the area may
feel disenfranchised if the proposed benefits do not directly affect them
[Garnett, 2006, 4]. Dignitary harms usually represent the most intangible
factors. Therefore, they are the most difficult to compensate.
In many situations, the personal portion can be accounted for with
more than fair market compensation. When dealing with properties not on
the market, prices usually exceed market values by 20-25 percent
[Garnett, 2006, 11]. The developers of a new GM plant in South Bend,
Indiana utilized this concept. Under time constraints, General Motors paid
well over market values to be fair to the condemned landowners. On
average, the property owners received 157 percent of the average
appraised value of their property [Garnett, 2006, 12]. Some owners
received more in replacement expenses than they did for the value of their
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house. While this project may be an outlier under the pressure of time, it
shows that respecting the existing property owners can benefit all parties.
Given the unique nature of this venture, the majority of development
projects still need to be checked, and states have begin to balance eminent
domain with full force.

VI. The Net Effect
The backlash to Kelo was fast and furious. The U.S. House of
Representatives approved a resolution to criticize the condemnation
power passed by the Court [Garrett and Rothstein, 2007, 5]. The House
also considered a bill to disallow any federal funding for development in
which eminent domain is present. A year after the decision, President
Bush issued an executive order to address the issue. With such general
language, the order did little to restrict the use of eminent domain. In fact,
the order seems to uphold the Court’s decision by stating property should
only be taken “for the purpose of benefiting the general public” [Bush,
2006, 1].
The actions taken by the federal, legislative, and executive branches
pale in comparison to the real changes at the state level. As of the
November 2006 general election, 34 states have taken measures to
address Kelo [Echeverria, 2006, 2]. The legislation ranges from statues
to constitutional amendments or even both. States have not let the Kelo
decision rest. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
the state legislation falls into seven general categories [NCSL, 2006, 1]:
•

•

•

•

Prohibiting eminent domain for economic development purposes,
to generate tax revenue, or to transfer private property to another
private entity.
Defining what constitutes "public use," generally the possession,
occupation or enjoyment of the property by the public at large,
public agencies or public utilities.
Restricting eminent domain to blighted properties and redefining
what constitutes blight to emphasize detriment to public health or
safety.
Requiring greater public notice, more public hearings,
negotiation in good faith with landowners and approval by
elected governing bodies.
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•
•
•

Requiring compensation greater than fair market value where
property condemned is the principal residence.
Placing a moratorium on eminent domain for economic
development.
Establishing legislative study committees or stakeholder task
forces to study and report back to legislature with findings.

As evidenced by the categories, the states differ greatly in their response
to Kelo. State variations represent alternative approaches as they are
“productively experimenting with different approaches to policy reform
in this important and controversial area” [Echeverria, 2006, 1].
One issue that remains unclear is the definition of blight and public
use. Due to vague definitions, many states’ policies are empty. To clamp
down on eminent domain but leave ambiguous definitions will garner
mixed results. Many state actions are misplaced with backdoors left open.
For instance, California can condemn properties under blight designations
for “substandard design, inadequate size given present standards and
market conditions, or lack of parking” [Sandefur, 2006, 105]. While these
issues may require attention, they are too vague to automatically make a
property blighted. Worse yet, Delaware law only requires local officials
to tell property owners why they have chosen to condemn their property
[Sandefur, 2006, 106]. While the actions of many states remain woefully
insufficient to adequately protect property rights, the quick action of
states has laid the foundation for more efficient and effective long-run
solutions. Ultimately, the infrastructure must be built on a higher level to
ensure equitable property rights nationwide.

VII. Policy Recommendations: The Future of Eminent
Domain
To protect property rights, national law must be invoked to reconcile the
power of eminent domain with private property rights. States should be
allowed to tighten eminent domain restrictions as they see fit. However,
the federal legislature must intervene with clear, minimum standards in
order to shelter property rights and the freedom derived therefrom. In
doing so, property rights will be solidified yet tempered with the
government necessity to use eminent domain.
Before the states’ backlash, the issue of eminent domain was largely
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left up to precedent of court judgments. However, when defining property
rights in relation to the needs of all citizens, the responsibility must fall
on the “democratically elected representatives of the people rather than
the judiciary” [Gostin, 2006, 11]. Judges simply cannot be allowed to
pass decisions which empower states to exploit property rights by the
conscionable standards of local officials. Changes must be implemented
on a wide scale in three key realms: Public, Private, and Procedural.
A. THE PUBLIC ROLE
As stated earlier, to consider eminent domain under perceived public
benefits may be a misplaced notion. However, no development project
should go forward unless concrete gains are present in the comprehensive
plan. If private entities demonstrate public profit, public support will be
garnered. In turn, broad public appeal will lead to decreased need for
eminent domain. If the demand for a project increases, the supply of
properties in question will also increase. This creates a fair market value
situation in which all parties can benefit.
On a smaller scale, it is essential to allow individual community
members initiate development project hearings democratically. Projects
must be made public from the beginning so that accountability can be
administered by the community [Zax and Malcolm, 2005, 86]. The
developer must be present during town meetings, and referendums with
a majority vote should veto bad projects. These measures will put the
onus on development companies and local governments to work with the
community as a whole. If the public is given more of a say in the project,
the ultimate power will move closer to equilibrium to create a more
symbiotic relationship.
Lastly, an internal check and balance must be implemented. State
wide review boards could rule on the use of eminent domain. These
bodies would modify the use of eminent domain to fit the economic
concerns of individual states. It would be prudent to utilize the expertise
of unbiased real estate professionals. These positions could be appointed
by the governor and then blended with at least two elected board
members. Establishing eminent domain review boards would take the
power out of the hands of activist judges and entrust it with professionals
and elected officials who understand the situation more completely.
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B. PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY
If private entities are included in development projects, the private
developer must be selected fairly and held to task throughout the project
[Zax and Malcolm, 2005, 86]. To avoid government collusion with
private entities, development plans must be formed before a private
developer is brought into the process. After a comprehensive plan is in
place, city planners can search for the best development agency to carry
out their plan. If the developer is chosen from a pool of candidates, the
public can rest assured that market forces chose the developer, not secret,
back-handed agreements.
After a development agency is selected, assurances must be made by
the developer to the municipality. The phony promises of profit driven
businessmen will not suffice. The developer must be obligated to fulfill
the promises set forth in the comprehensive plan. This can be done in a
variety of ways. Perhaps the most stringent is contractual obligation. To
a lesser extent, the developer could forge dual ownership with the city to
ensure a check and balance partnership. In cases of complete failure, the
developer will be forced to hand over ownership back to the city. With
the city in control of the property, local officials can then attempt the
development again with a new agency.
C. PROCEDURAL POSSIBILITIES
Since local governments are intertwined with any publicly planned
development project, they must remain involved throughout the life of the
venture. Zax and Malcolm suggest a governmental role in a project
“would provide additional evidence of the continuing public purposes
served by condemnation for economic development” [2005, 87].
In addition to expanded public/private partnerships, prescriptive
guidelines must be implemented to guide projects. Local officials should
be the initiators of development, not the authority on how the
development should be carried out. Minimum procedural guidelines will
ensure a standard level of expectations, thus decreasing the incidence of
bad projects and poor management due to lack of guidance.
On top of statutory guidelines, improvements must be made to the
land assembly process. Developers must attempt to negotiate with
property owners before eminent domain is threatened. This procedure will
ensure fair conditions are present before eminent domain is used. During
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negotiations, developers must be required to attain at least two separate
appraisals to establish a minimum value. This value will be used to
determine a fair above market value price given intangible factors. While
it may be difficult to set a national standard, an arranged premium for any
condemned property can be established. Indiana is a primary example.
Any condemned property used as a primary residence must be
compensated at 150 percent of fair market value [NCSL, 2006, 3].
The last procedure that must be remedied is definitional. A clear,
working description of blight must be established. Current blight
definitions create a back door for many local officials to initiate
questionable uses of eminent domain. Supreme Court Justice Kennedy
addressed this issue during Kelo oral arguments. Justice Kennedy asserted
that blight will always “be in the eye of the beholder” [Zax and Malcolm,
2005, 88]. The abuse of blight will be stifled if this broad concept is
narrowed. Many states have already begun to constrict the definition. In
Alabama, redevelopment projects can only declare properties blighted if
they are detrimental to the public health and safety [NCSL, 2006, 2].
While this definition still remains vague enough for the imaginative to
abuse, the intent is more restrictive than many current loophole, senseless,
or dated definitions of blight.

VIII. Conclusion
Kelo vs. New London revived a heated debate over property rights. The
decision handed down better intentions for the use of eminent domain
then judgments of the past. It also forced many states to take a closer look
at the issue, which has effectively begun the discussion for wide-scale
reform. In terms of the lawful use of eminent domain, the holdout
problem provides the economic justification for condemnation. Going
forward, national reform can eliminate the inefficiencies of developments
using eminent domain. In doing so, the benefits will be realized with
much greater scope and significance in every project.
In many developments there are only a handful of individuals
delaying project success. The positive benefits incurred by the majority
of affected property owners are rarely reported. If both sides are weighed
fairly, should economic progress be thwarted because of a small
minority’s objections? At any rate, eminent domain will continue to be a
tool used by governments to provide public essentials, and it will forever
remain a debatable issue in private development. To bring both sides
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closer together, federal legislation drafted to install minimum standards
will more efficiently allocate the economic and societal rewards. Most
importantly, reform can effectively strike a balance between the power of
eminent domain and the supreme freedom associated with property rights.
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